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The interlinkages between banks has been identified as one of the principle justifications for Too Big
To Fail policies of banking authorities. This paper investigates the interlinkages present in banks in
the USA using the Fed Funds and Repo positions as a proxy for exposures of individual banks.
Reinforcing existing research, relatively strong correlations are revealed between size of exposure and
size of bank, as well as correlations between exposure and distance from some money centers.
Interesting fluctuations in these correlations are found to be consistent with perspective of banks as
portfolios. The relationships identified by this study are evidence of fundamental economic
phenomena, and provide support for the notion that bank interlinkages have the potential to engender
banking crises across international boundaries.
JEL Classification: D2, E5, G2, L1, R1
Introduction
The recent banking crisis has provided strong support for the notion of banks that are Too Big
To Fail (TBTF) and the response of Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) as the proper response
mechanism in a crisis situation. The principal justification for this policy response is that
interlinkages with other banks might result in a cascade of failures should a very large sized
bank be allowed to fail. Theoretically the logic of this policy is straightforward (see Friedman
and Schwarz (1963) amongst others), as is the natural tendency for banks to wish to grow in
size (see Berger, et.al (1999), McFadden (2008)). Past empirical work has discovered that
there is an inverse relationship between the size of banks and their willingness to lend short
term funds to other banks. Moreover, there is a clear positive relationship between size and
willingness to borrow short term funds from other banks (see Lucas et. al. (1977), Maerowitz
(1981), Stigum (1982), Allen and Saunders (1986), and McFadden (2008)).
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Interbank exposure is of course a key parameter in the probability of a cascade failure in the
banking system. A study which is now appearing dated, estimated average actual interbank
exposures of banks in the USA to be at least as high as 15% (Furfine (1999)). However, it
may be argued that if all banks are well diversified in their exposures, then the theoretical
basis for the Too Big To Fail (TBTF) policy would be impaired. On the other hand, if smaller
banks tend to be highly exposed and concentrated in their exposures, a TBTF policy would be
much more justifiable. Using regularly reported data as a proxy for exposures, this study
provides statistics concerning levels of exposures in relation to the size of banks and the
relative degree of granularity present in the market. Additionally, as an indication of the
potential for transmission of contagion, it seeks to determine the variability in exposures
relative to distance from money centers.
Interbank exposures may take the form of Fed Funds positions, short term Repos (repurchase
agreements), correspondent banking accounts, interbank loans and other types of interbank
accounts. Many of these exposures are uninsured or only partially insured and in the event of
bankruptcy, banks exposed on the asset side may suffer substantial losses, thus creating a
vector for transmission of contagion. Data concerning many types of exposures are not easily
obtainable; however, this study takes the position that the Fed Funds/Repos positions of banks
provided in call reports are in fact a good indication of the degree of interbank exposure.
Interbank exposures may be expected to be heterogeneous across banks for several reasons.
Such heterogeneity may be a logical outcome of ‘distance costs’, with banks becoming
exposed to an increasing number of other banks as they grow larger (see McFadden (2008) for
a full discussion). Essentially such theory resides in the fact that returns on investment
alternatives in a closely restricted geographic area are more likely to be highly correlated than
potential investments in regions that are more geographically separate. Distance costs
constrain banks’ abilities to profitably invest in the less highly correlated but more distant
investment alternatives. Thus banks seek to grow larger by implanting themselves into
progressively more distant regions in order to reduce the cost imposed by geographic
separation. As they do so, their total asset size becomes larger while their diversification
opportunities increase, improving their return/risk ratios as well as reducing their proportional
exposure to any single investment.
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Smaller banks may choose to offset excess risk from their more limited investment
alternatives by investing in what are perceived as lower risk assets such as Fed Funds, as well
as short term deposits at other, more well diversified larger banks. Logically, therefore,
smaller banks should be net suppliers of Fed Funds and short term deposits while larger banks
should be net demanders of the same. Geo-spatial economic theory would have small banks
are being more likely to be found farther from metropolitan centers (see for example Fujita, et
al (2001)). Thus it may be possible to discern a relationship between exposure to interbank
lending and distance from banking centers.
The following relationship may therefore be hypothesized:
111   DTA
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i (2)
where: TAi = the size of a bank as measured by its total assets
Foi = funds offered via interbank accounts of a bank
Fpi = funds purchased via interbank accounts of a bank
The prior expectation is that the correlation between distance and exposure on the offering
side will be positive and negative on the purchasing side.
To fully test the relationships between size and exposure and distance and exposure, it would
be necessary to have detailed information concerning individual bank portfolios.
Nevertheless, it may be hypothesized that systematically high exposure to Fed Funds and
repos (repurchase contracts) on the asset side by small banks coupled with systematically low
exposure to similar assets by large banks may provide some support for the theory described
above. The existence of such relationships has been demonstrated by earlier empirical studies
of the Fed Funds market (as mentioned above), but the present document confirms that such
trends are still present in today’s market and, moreover, tests the stability of such
relationships.
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The Data
This study examines quarterly bank balance sheet data over the period Q1/2000 to Q1/2009.
Data is taken from call reports which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
collects on all credit institutions that subscribe to deposit insurance in the USA. The
information is freely available and is accessible via the internet1. Quarterly data is available
only since the beginning of 2000.
The data made available by the FDIC is extensive, but not without problems in its usage.
Notably, the Fed Funds and repos offered and purchased by banks are provided as summary
data reported by each reporting bank. There is no detail concerning maturity or counterparty.
Fed Funds, which are uninsured and uniquely interbank accounts, are reported together with
repos, which are collateralized and include investment banks within their market. It is
impossible to disaggregate the reported number in order to determine the level of only Fed
Funds.
Also, it should be noted that banks with less than $100 million in total assets are not required
to separately report all accounts, nor are thrifts required to separately report interbank activity;
and, judging by the substantial number of banks in the sample that reported neither funds
offered nor purchased (roughly 14% of all banks in the data set). Missing data has a strong
potential for introducing bias into the statistics in the study. This is particularly true where
smaller banks lend on a day to day deposit basis to ‘broker’ banks which in turn market the
money onto the Fed Funds market. Moreover, there is a strong likelihood that small banks do
not report their market positions since they are not required to do so. This would clearly tend
to weaken any statistics seeking to describe a relationship between size and exposure, or
distance to metropolitan centers and exposure.
The Relationship between Asset Size and Exposure to Fed Funds & Repos
The relationship between size and exposure varies substantially in any one reporting period
depending upon whether or not one includes all banks within the measure or only those
reporting an exposure. Moreover, a number of very large banks report simultaneous
1 http://www.fdic.com
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exposures on both sides of the market and correlations will differ depending upon whether
one includes such banks on a net exposure basis or simply include their actual exposure on
both sides. The following graphs provide a visual image of the evolution in the correlations
between the total assets of banks and their exposure to a specific side of the market.
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Additional contribution to variation would be the fact that the number of banks offering Fed
Funds and the number of banks purchasing Fed Funds in any given year of the survey are
substantially different. The following graph provides a pictoral display of the evolution in the
numbers of banks on a quarterly basis since the start of the year 2000. Clearly, the ongoing
consolidation in the sector has something to do with this source of variance.
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Small exposures would be relatively insignificant in systemic terms. What would be
worrisome, however, is if a large percentage of bank assets were exposed to this source of
risk. The following charts present the percentage of total US bank assets that are
characterized by exposures of greater than 5% to this source of risk.
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In each of the time periods covered by the survey, the mean value of the total assets of highly
exposed Fed Fund offering banks is substantially below that of highly exposed Fed Fund
purchasing banks. Moreover, the number of highly exposed offering banks is considerably
larger than that of highly exposed purchasing banks. These facts are particularly interesting in
light of the relationships between distance from banking centers and exposure established in
further statistical testing of the data base.
Relationship between Exposure and Distance from Money Centers
The FDIC call report data includes zip codes of bank headquarter locations; thus, it is possible
to calculate the geographic distance between the centroid of a bank’s zip code region and any
other point on the globe. Using the centroid as a proxy for the bank’s actual location,
distances in kilometers were calculated between each bank in the data set and the
geographical center of 15 major metropolitan centers2 in the USA.
Significant, positive correlations exist between the magnitude of exposure to short term
lending of funds and the nearest distances to major metropolitan centers in the USA, i.e.,
banks with a greater percentage of their assets in the FREPO market tend to be farther from
metropolitan areas. The following charts present correlations between exposure to either the
FREPO or FREPP of banks (banks reporting no activity in either market were dropped from
the data set) and distances to the nearest metropolitan center.
2 Seattle, Los Angles, Houston, Kansa City, St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Jacksonville,
Montgomery, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston.
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What is immediately clear from these charts is that there is only a slight correlation between
distance from city centers and exposure on the asset side of the market. A possible reason for
the weakness of the correlations on the asset side may reside in the fact that small banks are
not required to report FREPO or FREPP data and may thus have been excluded from the
statistical analysis as ‘missing data’.
The correlations, as measured, are not constant, but vary across the time period studied.
Notably, in the years 2000 and in the year 2007 the correlation between distance and exposure
to the asset side went negative. It is clear that financial markets in both years were under
great tension: in 2000 there was a ‘collapse’ of the so-called internet bubble in the equity
markets, and in 2007 the beginning of the current, ongoing, worldwide banking crisis. This
change to negative correlation may be seen as a rational risk aversion on the part of banks
which normally offer liquid assets. Unfortunately, the paucity of data points and events do
not allow for more rigorous econometric treatment of this proposition.
On the liability side of the market, the correlation between distance from money centers and
exposure are consistently and substantially negative. This of course can be viewed as strong
support for the geo-spatial argument which would have the larger banks located close to or
within money centers. As demonstrated earlier in this study, it is indeed the larger banks
which are overwhelmingly the purchasers of short term funds.
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Summary and Conclusion
The mosaic of the evidence obtained via the empirical examination of the call report data of
the FDIC provides evidence that is favorable to the proposition that smaller banks will lend
proportionately more to larger banks. It is also favorable to the proposition that banks located
farther from money centers will tend to lend proportionately more to other banks. Although
the evidence in favor of these relationships is in the form of the proxy of Fed Funds and repos
and there is no other data available that clearly establishes the existence of interlinkages
between small banks and larger banks. The large banks, as a group, are net purchasers of
funds.
The weight of the evidence is therefore in favor of the theory that the highly exposed offering
banks are indeed highly exposed to larger banks. The statistics presented in this study butress
this proposition. Moreover, since the number of purchasing banks is substantially less than
the number of offering banks, the risk of any purchasing bank failing will most probably
affect more than one smaller, highly exposed offering bank.
Again, there is no direct evidence in this data that indicates that highly exposed smaller banks
are in fact highly exposed to larger banks, but the probabilities involved and the evidence
presented in the statistical runs and the charts strongly support the conclusion that such a
relationship exists. This in turn provides support for the proposition that larger banks
represent a greater degree of systemic risk to the economy than do smaller banks. There are
clear implications in so far as concerns prudential regulation. Additionally, the correlation
between distance from money centers and exposure provide some evidence of the existence of
a transmission mechanism for contagion via the short term funds market.
Given the stability of the relationships discovered, it may be that the relationships are
symptoms of fundamental economic forces such as those discussed in McFadden (2008)
which push smaller banks to diversify by lending to large banks (so much the better if these
larger banks are Too Big To Fail) and that banks become larger by diversifying
geographically. Should such growth entail international diversification, it seems clear that the
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bankruptcy of such a bank would certainly create the potential for an international
transmission of a banking crisis.
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